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Abstract 
Security in power systems refers to the ability of the sys- 
tem to withstand imminent disturbances (contingencies). 
Maintaining security is an issue which must be addressed 
at the system level. It is shown in this paper, however, 
that it is possible to maintain system security in an o p t -  
ing environment with many pikipants (power CM- 
panies, independent power producers, CO-generators, con- 
sumers) each attempting to optimize their own benefit, 
through pricing incentives and appropriate information 
exchange, Rates for power generation/consumption and 
for an offer to use during a contingency, as well as infor- 
mation on the pbability distribution of contingency need 
for each participant, are derived so that individual optimi- 
zation will lead to the socially optimal solution in which 
system security is optimized and the aggregate benefit is 
maximized. 
Keywords: Demand-side management, spot pricing, 
power system security, real-time pricing, power system 
reliability. 
I. Introduction 
The ultimate nightmare in power system operation 
is the occurrence of a widespread blackout like the one 
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in New York in 1977, which causes tremendous 
economic losses to society and sevm equipment damage 
to the utility El]. The initiating event of such a blackout is 
typically a disturbomce on the system, for example, lightn- 
ing on a transmission line or failure of a generator. Dis- 
turbances occur frecluently in power systems. Redm- 
dancy in generation and msmission facilities is built into 
the interconnected power system to make sure most dis- 
turbances can be tolerated. It is only when the effect of a 
disturbance cannot be contained and it causes overload 
and subsequent disconnection of equipment in other parts 
of the interconnected system that cascading outages 
occur. 
Stringent planning and operating guidelines are se€ 
up to avoid cascading outages [2]. Planning  engineer^ 
and system dispatchers strive to make sure that the system 
is planned and operated according to these reliability cri- 
teria. The criteria are expressed in two related forms, one 
being primarily for the generation system and the other 
being primarily for the transmission system. The fonner 
is a requirement on generation reserve, over and above 
the forecasted load demand. 'Ihe latter is a requkment 
that the system should be able to withstand and survive a 
setofpossibledisturbancesinthefonnofgenerationand 
transmission outages, which are called (credible) con- 
tingencies. This aspect of a system's capability is usually 
referred to as securit.r. In OW words, a system is secure 
if it is able to withstand a set of credible Contingencies. In 
system operation, concern for security always comes first, 
and only when the system is secure does one consider 
economic dispatch. If the current operating point would 
not swive one of the credible contingencies, then tbe 
operating point is changed by dispatching generation or 
load to make it survivable, even at the expense of econ- 
omy. This is called security control or preventive conhrol 
[3]. Security requires the system to have enough controll- 
able resources such as spinning reserve and ditect load 
control to be able to steer the system to nonnalaperaoion 
should a contingency occur. 
System security is a concept that is particular to 
interconnected power systems. It is not determined by the 
capacity of individual generam, loads, or transmission 
lines. It is a property that has to be considered at the sys- 
tem level. There is usually more than one redispatch of 
~ 
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generation and consumption which would maintain secu- 
rity. Different combinations requiring different contribu- 
tions from individual generators and consumers may 
result in the same level of security. In the traditional situa- 
tion where the utility is operated as a monopoly, security 
control is executed by the dispatchers exercising their 
authority to dictate the power output of each generator. 
The interesting research problem of how the dispatchers 
should set these outputs has been extensively studied over 
the past 15 years (see, for example, the extensive bibliog- 
raphy in U]). 
However, this traditional model of power systems 
operation is loosing its validity. Economic and techno- 
logical changes have resulted in increasing numbers of 
generators which are owned and operated by entities 
other than the utility. These include independent power 
producers and co-generators. Further, changes in com- 
muniations technology will make it possible for some 
consumers to rapidly respond to system conditions. Both 
this type of consumer and non-utility generators should be 
considered as part of the security control problem. 
One approach to security control is to maintain 
more or less the existing operating paradigm. Producers 
and consumers other than the utility are required to make 
available additional capacity for the utility to use to main- 
tain security. This leads to such concepts as stand-by 
capacity requirement and dispatchability capability. This 
approach essentially requires the independent power pro- 
ducers and consumers to surrender their autonomy so that 
the utility has the authority to make decisions regarding 
system security. This would not lead to an economically 
efficient solution since the decisions would not take into 
account the cost structures of each participant. It may 
also raise the issue of fairness in light of the nonunique- 
ness of solutions to the security control problem. More- 
over, it would be difficult to continue this paradigm when 
there is no single dominant player in the system. 
In this paper we propose an alternative approach to 
maintaining system security-through inducement and 
cooperation. Each participant, be it a power company, an 
independent power producer, a co-generator or a consu- 
mer, is allowed to make its own decision concerning the 
most beneficial way to generate or consume electricity, as 
well as the amount to contribute for maintaining system 
security. However, we show that through pricing incen- 
tives and information on system needs, it is possible to 
achieve a socially optimal level of system security. The 
proposed approach assumes an operating paradigm that is 
characterized by decentralized decision-making. A dis- 
cussion of the new pamdigm is presented in the next sec- 
tion. 
The research reported in this paper extends the 
work of Schweppe et a1 [43 who first proposed the use of 
pricing to maintain system security [4, pp. 214-2221. 
Using the approach of our earlier work [5], we have 
developed a probabilistic framework for calculating and 
achieving a socially optimal level of security, which prop- 
erly allocates the burden of maintaining security to parti- 
cipants. The security/economy trade-off is thus resolved. 
II. A Decentralized Operating Paradigm 
In this paper, no distinction is made between those 
who consume and those who produce electrical energy. 
Each entity that engages in the generation or consumption 
of electrical energy or in the operation of a power system 
is referred to as a participant. These include electric utili- 
ties, independent power producers, co-generators and 
consumers. It is also assumed that there is one body 
responsible for setting prices for electricity and for pub- 
lishing forecasts. This body is referred to as the price 
setter and its objective is to coordinate the interactions of 
the participants, producing a socially optimal outcome. 
The operating decisions of each participant have 
two effects. First, they determine the actual level of 
operation of the participant at the present (operations) 
time. Secondly, according to how the participant’s plant 
has been configured, the staffing levels and other such 
present time decisions, different levels of response to pos- 
sible future system contingencies will be possible. For 
example, a production facility with CO-generation might 
be configured so that the production facility could be 
rapidly by-passed, leading to a quick increase in electrical 
output. Another example might involve maintaining a 
higher level of storage, enabling a rapid reduction in 
electrical load demand without damaging the production 
facility. Thus each participant determines at the operation 
times the additional power that it could supply in the 
event of a contingency, either by reducing demand or 
increasing its electrical output. This amount is referred to 
as the contingency offering, and must be determined in 
conjuction with the other operations decisions. In the 
event of a contingency occurring, the amount of addi- 
tional support from each participant is limited by its con- 
tingency offering. 
The socially optimal solution for the actual level of 
generationlconsumption of each participant at the present 
time is well-known - spot pricing at short-run marginal 
cost. The rest of this section will be devoted to the dis- 
cussion of (i) what constitutes a socially optimal solution 
for participants’ contingency offerings and (ii) how to 
induce the participants to offer that. It should be men- 
tioned, however, a unified approach, encompassing both 
decisions, is actually adopted in the mathematical deriva- 
tion in this paper. 
In order to achieve a socially optimal coordination 
of operating decisions, it is necessary to account for the 
costs and benefits of all participants. There are three 
577 
types of costs which are particularly relevant to security 
control. Theseare: 
0 The cost of a participant being prepared to respond 
to a contingency. This might, for example, include 
increased fuel costs associated with maintaining a 
spinning reserve or the costs of maintaining a 
higher storage level. These costs are acpctually 
incurred at the operations time. 
The cost to a participant of actually responhg to a 
system contingency by reducing demand or increas- 
ing electrical output. costs are only incurred 
in the event of a contingency. 
System collapse costs which arise if the security 
control fails to avert a system collapse. These costs 
are borne by society as a whole and include the 
effects of a failure of the entire supply system. 
The objective is to achieve a socially optimal set of 
contributions to security control. That is, it is desired to 
encourage a contingency offering and, in the event of a 
contingency, actual support from each participant which 
minimizes the total social costs. The social costs can be 
thought of as the sum of three terms: 
0 the sum of each participant's costs associated with 
their contingency offering 
0 the sum of each participant's expected cost of 
responding to a contingency (i.e. the sum of the 
actual response costs weighted by the probability of 
the contingency occurring) 
expected system collapse costs (i.e. the product of 
the probability that the system will collapse and the 
actual cost of a collapse). 
By minimizing these costs, the optimal economic trade- 
off between level of security and the cost of maintaining 
it will be found. 
One possible approach could be based on issuing 
real time prices which rise during contingencies, thereby 
encouraging increasing generation and r e d u d  load 
demand. During normal state operation, probabilistic 
forecasts of future prim would be required to obtain 
appropriate levels of preparedness (i.e. contingency offer- 
ings). These forecasts would need to account for the pro- 
'bability of each contingency. Each participant would 
respond to these forecasts by minimizing its costs which 






the cost of its contingency offering and 
the expected actuation costs minus the income 
earned from the contingent spot prices. Here the 
expectation is over the probability distribution of 
the price forecast. 
The main disadvantage of this approach arises 
because serious contingent events occur quite infre- 
quently. Thus the price setter would have no opportunity 
to develop knowledge of the way in which the system 
contingency offerings would vary with price fonxasts. 
price seUing and fopecaSting would therefore occur 
without feedback and could be quite hamuate. 
In this paper, we propose a different arrangement 
which avoids this problem by establishing contractual 
obligations for contingency offerings. At the oped- 
time, each participant is shown a price for contingency 
offerings and a forecast of the probability of various lev- 
els of actual support that might be asked for. 'Ihis prdba- 
bilistic forecast would be parameaized by the level of 
contingency offering. The meaning of a gim level of 
offering is that, should a contingency occur, any level of 
system suppart up to that level of umtingency offering 
may be taken from the participant. Thus, while the parti- 
cipant detemines its own level of potential wnmition, 
level in the event of a contingency. 
Each participant will respond to the price for con- 
tingency offerings and the forecasts of usage of con- 
tingency response by choosing its own level of con- 
tingency offering. It will aim to maximize its own profits, 
which can be written as the sum of: 
0 income from fhe sale of the contingency offering 
(i.e. the product of the price and the size of the con- 
tingency offering) 
minus the cost of preparing the plant to offer that 
level of contingency offering 
minus the expected cost of actually supplying sys- 
tem support, where the expeztation is over the pro- 
bability and size of the support, as determined by 
theforecast 
Clearly, the price and forecast of usage should be 
designed to encourage socially optimal levels of con- 
tingency offerings. The main advantage of this scheme is 
that the price (and forecast) setter has feedback on the 
levels of contingency support before a contingency occurs 
and can therefore adjust the price if thm is either too lit- 
tle or an excess of system s u m  Thus there is a closed 
The main result of this paper shows that there is 
indeed a price that can be set for contingency offerings 
and a forecast for actual contingent usage that etlcourages 
each m i p a n t  to make a socially optimal contingency 
offering (Le. offerings which minimize the total social 
costs). In Section III of this paper, the above notions of 
interactions between participants and the price settet are 
made precise. The main pricing result is stated in Section 
IV and proved in the Appendix. 
It is shown that the price far each unit of con- 
tingency offering should be set equal to the incremental 
effect on expected contingency costs, i.e. the derivative 
with respect to contingency offering level of the sum of 
0 expected system collapse costs (i.e. the product of 
the actual system collapse costs and the probability 
the system operator determines the actual contriblltion 
0 
0 
loop in the price setting process. 
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that the system will collapse), and 
the sum of each participants expected costs of actu- 
ally responding to a contingency. 
It is shown that a forecast for actual contingency 
usage is also necessary in order to induce socially optimal 
response. The forecast shows the participant how the pro- 
bability of various levels of actual contingent support will 
change as a function of his/her contingent offering. 
0 
III. Mathematical Formulation 
1. Preliminaries 
Let the set of participants in the power system be 
represented by the index set J . Thus each j E J is either 
an electric utility, an independent power producer, a CO- 
generator or a consumer. Let the symbol 00 represent 
normal (noncontingent) operation and IR represent the set 
of contingencies. For each participant j E J, let y,  
represent j ' s  net level of injection of electrical energy 
into the system. Thus if j is a consumer y,  is negative 
and -y, is j ' s  level of power consumption. If, on the 
other hand, j is a net producer of electrical energy, then 
y ,  is positive and equal to j ' s  level of power generation. 
(See [5] for further details.) Further let Z j  represent j ' s  
contingent offering being the largest injection that the 
participant is prepared to offer. The difference between 
zj and y j  might represent additional generation (spinning 
reserve) or consumption reduction (load management). 
Contingency offering is the limit set by the participant 
that can be taken should a contingency happen. In the 
following to simplify presentation, we assume that z, > 0, 
implying a net injection and that the actual injection is 
somewhere between 0 and z,. The results apply equally 
well to net consumers. Let the actual amount taken from 
participant j ,  when a contingency w E IR indeed occurs, 
be represented by C j  (a). Thus C j  (0) is the actual value 
Of y j  after the contingency. Under that z, > 0, we have 
t 1) 
We define the J-vectors y , z , C  to be the vectors of 
Whether a contingency is survivable depends on 
the contingency w and the system's ability to settle into a 
stable operating point after redispatch of generation and 
consumption. Survivability also requires that the new 
operating point does not cause equipment overload and 
abnormal voltages. For each contingency, the ability of 
the system to survive will depend on the level of support 
available to it. We may use a vector relationship to 
represent this, i.e., the system survives if and only if 
(2) 
-. 
0 I Cj (0) I zj 
Y j  9 zj t C j  
S(C(O), 0) s 0 . 
The exact form of the above inequality can be derived 
from transient stability and load flow considerations [6,7]. 
Now we can define the set of survivable contingencies 
Q, ( z )  , for a given z , as follows: 
& ( z )  = (CO€ Q: 3 C(O) SuChthiX (3) 
For a given set of contingency offering z and a sur- 
vivable contingency w E SZ, ( 2 ) .  the choice of c(w) is 
determined by the system dispatcher. When the choice is 
not unique, the system dispatcher may make the decision 
based on a reasonable criterion. One example of such a 
criterion is to maximize overall benefits of the partici- 
pants, the detail of which will be discussed at the end of 
the next subsection after the appropriate terms are 
defined. At any rate, since the actual amount taken from 
a participant C j  (a) during a contingency depends on the 
contingency w, as well as the contingency offerings z , let 
us use the function @ to explicitly represent this depen- 
dency, i.e., 
@ j  ( 2 9 0 )  = C j  (0) . (4) 
2. Socially Optimal Solutions 
TO introduce the socially optimal solution O;,& 
we need to define participants' benefit and cost terms. 
The cost of electricity is first separated from the other 
price-independent benefit and cost components of the par- 
ticipants. To simplify presentation, costs are all absorbed 
as negative benefits, so that a benefit term refers to the 
gross benefit minus (price-independent) cost. For exam- 
ple, for an industrial consumer "gross benefits" might 
include income earned from the sale of goods produced 
(except electrical energy) while "cost" would include the 
cost of purchasing all labor and raw materials (except 
electrical energy). 
bj Cy, , z j )  = benefit for j if there is no contingency 
j3, (zj , { j )  = benefit for j if the system takes con- 
Thus bj Cyj , z , )  is the "normal" level of benefits (minus 
costs) and the net revenue for j would, with probability 
PO, be bj Cyj , z j )  minus what is paid for electrical energy, 
plus what is earned from the sale of electrical energy. In 
general, j3j (zj , C j )  will be negative, representing the cost 
to j of j 's response. 
For each participant j E J , define: 
tingency response C j  when j offered zj . 
For the set of contingencies SZ , define: 
P ( *)  = probability measure on SZ U (001 
PO = P (( @)), i.e., the probability of normal 
(non-contingent) operation. 
For a given set of contingency offerings z , the pro- 
bability that the system is secure can be obtained as: 
(5) 
Therefore, (1 - R (2)) is the probability, given the con- 
tingency offering z ,  that the system will not be secure, 
i.e., it is the probability that the system will collapse. Let 
the s&ial cost of system collapse be & n p d  by Kat. 
The socially optimal solution 01 , z )  is defined as an 
operating point for which the expected total benefit of all 
participants is maximized, the expected cost of system 
collapse is minimized, alI participants are operating under 
their respective limits, and the power generation and con- 
sumption in the system are balanced. 
The limits imposed by participant j 's plant can be 
written as a set of inequalities: 
(6) h j b j  , Z j )  =< 0 . 
For example, a consumer's level of demand is limited by 
the capacity of its plant. The power balance may be 
represented by the load flow equations. However, for 
simplicity, here the power balance i s  written simply as 
Yam+ C Y j  = 0 (7) 
J e J  
where Y, includes other generation-cmnsumption and 
transmission losses. The results presented below can very 
easily be generalized by replacing equation (7) with a full 
set of power flow equations and inequalities representing 
line flow and bus voltage limits. 
With the noption introduced above, the socially 
optimal solution ,i) is the solution of the following 
optimization problem. 
The first term in the objective function in equation 
(8) is the expected participant's benefits associated with 
"normal" (non-contingent) operation. The second term is 
the expected social costs of a system collapse while the 
third term is the negative of the expected participant's 
costs of responding to a survivable contingency. 
Note that the costs of electricity are not present in 
the objective function in (8), this is because the revenue 
from the sale of electricity by the producers (negative 
costs to producers) is equal to the what the consumers 
have to pay (costs to consumers), so the net cost from a 
societal point of view is zero. It is just a transfer pay- 
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ment. 
Returning to the selection of r(a) by the system 
dispatchex during a contingemy a, a socially optimal 
selection 
the following Optimization problem: 
max I /GJ Bj (zj , Cj (0)) : 0 
(2 ,a) may be obtrdned tiom the solution of 
Cj (a) zj , si , (9) 
S(C(a), a) I 01 - 
In the above formulation the dispatcher selects the 
contingency requirement (genetation or load reduction) 
from each pdcipant in such a way that the sum of the 
benefits of all participants is minimized. In other wOCCIS, 
the dispatcher's objective is to achieve a socially optimal 
solution under the circumstance. 
3. Participant's Decision Making 
Each participant is operating in a decentraked 
environment. He/she decides on the amount y k  to be gen- 
erated or consumed and the amount Zk to offer to the sys- 
tem to assist in maintaining system security. The decision 
is made purely to maximize his/her own benefit. 
We assume that each partkipant receives from the 
n k  (yk , z k )  = the price far electricity if participant 
tingencies; 
F k  ( q k  l Z k )  = probability that the system will take 
contingency support tj = qt from participant A if 
For participant k, the decision-making pblem is 
to maximize its own expected net benefit. This can be 
stated as the selection of 6% ,a) to solve: 
(10) 
system the following information: 
(i) 
k generates (COnSumeS) y k  and Off= Zk fOr Con- 
(ii) 
wasoffered. 
Inax ( P o b k  b k  Z k ) - x k  ( y k  s z k )  
P k  (zk * 6 ) f l k  (6 l z k ) :  hj b k  $4) =< 01 
The objective function in (10) repsents the 
expected net benefit (i.e., benefitcost) and it has Urree 
terms. The second term is the cost of electricity 
x k  b k ' , Z k ) .  The first and the third terms together 
represent the expected benefit. The first one is the benefit 
for k if there is no contingency, b k  ( y k  , Z k ) .  and it is 
weighted by its probability PO. The third term is the 
expected benefit for k if there is a contingency. 'Ihe 
benefit during a contingency depds  on how much is 
taken from k by the system. Since partkipant R receives 
the information on the probability distribution of how 
much the system will take from R if he/she offers 
Zk, F k  (6 lu). the expected benefit Can be calculated 
from the ink@ 6" p k  (z& , &) @k (6 I z k  ). Mmver ,  
participant k 's decision should be made within its plant 
limitation, i.e., hi ( y j  , z j )  I 0. 
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IV. Security Pricing 
In this section we will show that it is possible to 
achieve the socially optimal solution through participants, 
decentralized decision making if each participant receives 
proper pricing signals reflecting security needs and some 
additional information related to system security. The 
result will first be presented as a theorem, whose proof is 
in the Appendix, and the discussion of its interpretation 
will follow. 
We need to introduce more notation. Consider a 
fixed participant k E J , and define for each Zk and y k  , 
zk ( z k )  = ( i 1 , .  * (11) 
f k  b ’ k )  = G l ,  * . * 9 i k - l  , y k  , i k + 1 ,  ’ ‘ , i J )  (12) 
, i k - l ,  Z k ,  i k + 1 ,  * *  ‘ ,  i J )  
which are the vectors of contingent offerings and non- 
contingent injections (generation-consumption) if every- 
one except participant k makes socially optimal choices. 
Define 
(13) & ( z k )  = a (zk ( z k ) )  
which is the set of contingencies which are survivable. 
For ,each j E J including k itself, and for each 
W E  QS ( Z k )  define 
6 j  Ik ( z k  9 0) = aj (Zk ( z k ) ,  0) (14) 
which is the optimal utilization of participant j ’ s  con- 
tingent offering if y occurs and the vector of all partici- 
pants’ offerings is Z k  ( z k )  . Define 
Their meaning will be explained after we introduce the 
following theorem. 
Theorem. Suppose that participant k E J is shown price 
and forecasts given by 
where 6 is the shadow price of eq. (7) or the short run 
marginal cost of the system, then individual participant’s 
decision making as determined by the solution of (10) 
will be socially optimal: i.e., 
The theorem states that it is sufficient for each par- 
ticipant to be given: 
0 a pricing structure for electricity 
0 a forecast of contingency need. 
The price of electricity has two components, one 
for the participant’s generation or consumption, and one 
for his/her contingency offering. The rate charged for 
generation/consumption is the short-run marginal cost (6) 
of the system, which is consistent with previous results 
[4,51. The rate charged for participant k ’s contingency 
offering Zk can be viewed as the marginal contingency 
cost (&). It has two components (see. Eq.(16)): 
(1) Incremental effect of Zk on the expected cost of 
system collapse. This component is evaluated by 
first considering the effect of the change in con- 
tingency offering from the optimal Zk on the proba- 
bility of system collapse (1 - R (2)) assuying all 
other participants will offer the optimal z i  , and 
then considering the cost of system collapse Kat. 
Incremental effect of Zk on the expected costs of all 
other participants. This component is evaluated by 
again assyming all other participants will offer the 
optimal s i ,  and considering the effect of the 
change in pecipant k ’s contingency offering from 
the optimal z k  on the change in the expected total 
costs (negative benefits) of all other participants. 
It should be noted that in the first term, an increase 
in contingency offering will reduce the probability of col- 
lapse while in the second term, one participant’s increase 
in offering will result in a reduction of response costs for 
all other participants. 
The forecast of contingency need from participant 
k is the probability of the amount actually needed from 
participant k if helshe offers Zk . More precisely, it is 
expressed in terms of the conditional probability that 
given that participant k offers an amount Zk , the probabil- 
ity distribution of the amount the system will need from 
participet k assuming all other participants will offer the 
optimal z i  . 
(2) 
V. Conclusion 
In this paper a decentralized operating environment 
is assumed in which all participants including power com- 
panies, independent power producers, co-generators, and 
consumers attempt to optimize their own benefits of elec- 
tricity utilization or generation. Through pricing and 
forecast information, the end result is that they cooperate 
to maintain system security. 
The main result of this paper shows that there is 
indeed a price that can be set for contingency offerings 
and a forecast for actual contingent usage that encourages 
each participant to make a socially optimal contingency 
offering (i.e. offerings which minimize the total social 
Costs). 
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It is shown that the price for each unit of con- 
tingency offering should be set equal to the incremental 
effect on expected contingency costs, i.e. the derivative 
with respect to contingency offering level of the sum of 
0 expected system collapse costs (i.e. the product of 
the actual system collapse costs and the probability 
that the system will collapse), and 
the sum of each participants expected costs of actu- 
ally responding to a contingency. 
It is shown that a forecast for actual contingency 
usage is also necessary in order to induce socially optimal 
response. The forecast shows the participant how the pro- 
bability of various levels of actual contingent suppart will 
change as a function of the contingent offering. 
The proposed approach has the following charac- 
teristics: 
0 Decision making is decentralized; 
0 
0 
0 Security-economic tradeoff is incorporated, 
0 
0 
Supply-side and demand-side are treated equally; 
Utilities, other producers, and consumers mperate 
in system operation; 
Information technology is used to assist power sys- 
tem operation. 
The implementation of the proposed approach 
requires a communication, computing, and control (3C) 
system capable of calculating the needed pricing and 
forecasting information and mnsqitting to the partici- 
pants [SI. The amount of data communication may 
exceed the capability of existing energy management sys- 
tems [9]. Detailed implementation issues need to be 
explored and are outside! the scope of this paper. 
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Appendix 
Proof of Theorem 
Define i, , i j  ,6, , $ j  for j E J to be the (asstuned 
unique) solutions of the Kuhn-Tucker equaoionS for qua- 
tion (8): qR E J 
Define )?k , f k  , j k  to be the (assumed unique) soh- 
(27) 
tions of the Kuhn-Tucker equations for equation (10): 
a b k  a h k  alCk 
p o * + y b j T - a n  = O 
582 
It follows from equations (14) and (18) that for 
2 = 2' (2') 
Jn, (z) fj' (Zk, @k ( Z , @ ) )  e(@) (30) 
Thus, substituting equations (17) and (18) into equations 
(27) to (29) and comparing the resultin& eq~tions ,to 
equations (23) to (25) for k shows that yk , z L and yr 
€I satisfy equations (27) to (29). 
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Discussion 
LAURENCE D. KIRSCH, CHRISTENSEN ASSOCIATES. MADISON. 
WISCONSIN; AND FERNANDO ALVAFADO, UNIVERSITY OF WISCON- 
SIN: 
Kaye, Wu, and Varaiya are concerned with the 
problem of maintaining power system security in electric 
systems where there are many independent pafticipants 
(including both producers and consumers) who might 
contribute to security. Their paper describes the 
pricing incentives that might induce these participants 
to behave in an optimal manner. Using a single-period 
model, the paper demonstrates that, in an optimal 
pricing regime, power system participants should be paid 
one price for their actual power output and another 
price for their "contingency offering" (i.e., the output 
that they promise to provide upon request). The paper 
finds that the price for actual output is the shadow 
price of the power balance equation. Because the paper 
assumes constant transmission lospes. it finds that this 
price is the same for all participants. The paper finds 
that the price for contingency offerings varies by 
participant: each participant's price reflects the 
benefits that that participant's offering confera upon 
all other participants. 
We believe that Kaye. Wu, and Varaiya address 
issues that will become increasingly important as the 
decentralization of the power supply industry proceeds. 
We generally concur with their results. 
We note that similar results have been developed 
in the past. In reference 4 (page 216). for example, 
Schweppe. Caramanis, Tabors, and Bohn derive a two-part 
optimal price, with one part being a "security control 
implementation price". In EPRI project RP 2996-1. 
Caves, Kirsch. and Schoech also find a two-part price: 
the price for actual output depends upon multi-period 
dispatch, and varies by participant according to the 
participant's electrical location and according to the 
uncertainty in the participant's prospective output; 
while the contingency offering price, which is the same 
for all participants, is the market clearing price that 
is required to bring forth an adequate aggregate 
quantity of contingency offerings. The new element in 
Kaye. Wu. and Varaiya's results seems to be that the 
contingency ofikring price depends upon the benefits 
that each participant's offering confers upon all other 
participants, regardless of whether the others are 
demand-side or supply-side participants. 
We caution that all of the foregoing results -- 
including those by Kaye, Wu. and Varaiya -- assume 
perfect information. That information includes: 
advance knowledge, by system dispatchers, of which 
contingencies are survivable; advance knowledge, by each 
participant, of individual costs and benefits without 
contingencies and for each potential contingency 
response requirement; and advance knowledge. by each 
participant, of the probabilities that each potential 
contingency response might be called by system dispatch- 
ers. Furthermore, prices must be simultaneously set for 
all participants. In a theoretical d e l ,  these 
information requirements can be overlooked. For 
practical implementation. however, these requirements 
must be addressed. Fortunately, the evidence is that 
real markets operate well enough even though partici- 
pants have imperfect knowledge of their own benefit 
functions, and even though prices are more or less 
simultaneously set for all participants. The informa- 
tion problems that are peculiar to electric power system 
decentralization are therefore those that are best 
analyzed at the system dispatch level:' the problem of 
identifying important contingencies; and the problem of 
identifying probabilities of occurrence of various 
system configurations. 
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